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Abstract
We analyse the distributional impact of lowering social security contributions and
compensating the revenue loss by an increase in indirect taxes. We empirically assess
the distributional consequences of this shift by using two Belgian microsimulation
models: mod¶ et¶ e for the tax bene¯t system, and aster for the indirect tax part.
Since the underlying micro database of the tax bene¯t system does not contain
expenditures, we ¯rst impute detailed expenditures in the income data survey, by
means of semiparametric Engelcurves.
The currently living generation of pensioners belongs to the losers by such a
reform: They do not pro¯t from the reduced tax on labour income, but pay higher
consumption prices. Less obvious, also part of the working population loses. Even
not all those who leave unemployment after the reform are gainers.
We also investigate the sensitivity of the results w.r.t. the choice of welfare
measure to assess the combined change in disposable income, consumer prices and
- in the case of °exible labour supply - leisure. We show how the speci¯c choice and
parameters of the welfare measure will in°uence the conclusions, possibly even more
than the predictive model for assessing the behavioural reactions in labour supply.
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11 Introduction
In Belgium, as in many other European countries, proposals are launched to reduce social
security contributions and switch to indirect taxes as an alternative base to ¯nance the
social security system. The protagonists of these reforms guesstimate that labour market
distortions will in this way be diminished, and, as a result, that unemployment rates
would decline.
One strand in the literature uses macro and/or computable general equilibrium
(cge) models to assess the impact of either general or selective reductions of social
security contributions (see among others Bassiliµ ere et al. (2005), Cockx et al. (2005) and
Stockman (2002) for Belgium, and Buscher et al. (2001), BÄ ohringer et al. (2005) and
Steiner (2003) for Germany). The conclusions evidently depend on the speci¯c mea-
sures that are scrutinized. But in general the broad result seems to emerge of a warning
against overly optimistic expectations to lower persistently high unemployment rates by
decreasing social security contributions. Certainly a general (i.e. non targeted) reduc-
tion of social security contributions has only a modest impact on aggregate employment.
Moreover, in the long term, a compensation by means of indirect taxes might lead to
neutrality at the level of labour costs (and hence labour demand) due to compensating
wage demands (see Steiner (2003) and OECD (1994)).
The second, complementary, approach is framed within the incidence analysis of
public ¯nance and focuses on the distributional impact of this kind of reforms. This
focus is mostly absent in the above mentioned macro-models. Microsimulation models
are the prime candidates here to serve as tools of analysis. Indeed, tax bene¯t models
in principle allow to calculate for a representative sample of households or individuals
the impact bene¯t of the lowered social security contributions and the incidence of
the tax instrument used to ¯nance the operation. In practice however, this possibility
is more limited than suggested. First of all, few microsimulation models cover the
whole range of tax and bene¯t instruments that make up the chain from gross income
(let alone labour cost) up to a disposable income concept. Some models are tailored
to study the impact of personal income taxes, others focus more on social transfers
and bene¯ts, and still others only model the indirect tax system. One of the reasons
is that there are few representative micro datasets that both contain reliable income
information and at the same time detailed expenditure information to calculate indirect
tax liabilities. A problem that we will also face in this paper. Secondly, the integration
of behavioural reactions - a core element in a cge model - is much more complex in
the rich world of thousands of heterogeneous agents of a microsimulation model than
in the stylized cge-world. The rapid progress in micro-econometric estimation and
simulation techniques of the last decades has therefore only recently found its way in the
development of \behavioural microsimulation". Actually, this recent development seems
to have reinforced the compartmentalization of the microsimulation ¯eld, by focussing
2more on subgroups of the population for which behaviour can be suitably modelled.
Both these factors make it far from straightforward to extend the general cge anal-
ysis of this kind of reform with distributional considerations. This paper tries to ¯ll
this gap. In doing so, we are in line with the contribution by Bach et al. (2006). These
authors analyse the increase of the standard vat-rate from 16 to 19 percent, introduced
by the new German coalition government in 2005, and became e®ective as of January 1st
2007. They produce both an \impact" analysis of the distributional consequences, and
a second round e®ect, taking up behavioural response both on the expenditure side as
on the supply side of the labour market. They do not dispose of one integrated mi-
crosimulation model, nor of a dataset covering both incomes and detailed expenditures,
but cleverly link existing models and datasets.
We, too, do not aim at extending existing models or techniques. We rather combine
two separately existing microsimulation models (and datasets) to investigate the dis-
tributional e®ects of a shift in the ¯nancing source of social security away from taxing
labour towards indirect taxes. We describe the distributional e®ects for the whole pop-
ulation, and we obtain results that are very similar to those in Bach et al. (2006). The
reform is regressive in terms of disposable income and the currently living generation of
pensioners is most liable to pay for the reform. They do not enjoy the reduced labour
income tax, but they face nevertheless higher consumption prices. Yet, our approach
di®ers from the mentioned paper in two respects.
First, our behavioural model of labour supply is more limited in scope since we
are only able to model labour supply for couples. This limits the possibility to describe
distributional e®ects for the whole population if we want to take into account behavioural
reactions on the labour market. Secondly, more than Bach et al. (2006), we empahsize
the role played by the welfare measure to assess the distributional impact of this kind
of reforms. Traditionally, and certainly in policy oriented analyses, one limits oneself to
describe distributional patterns in terms of disposable income changes, at most corrected
by means of a consumer price index. Yet theoretically sound welfare measures are
available in the literature and have recently been extended and adapted for use in
discrete choice models and microsimulation contexts (see, amongst others, Creedy and
Kalb 2005a, Dagsvik and KarlstrÄ om 2005 and Preston and Walker 1999). In this paper
we want to investigate the sensitivity of the distributional picture of gainers and losers
of a reform to the chosen welfare metric. A fortiori, when not only the allocation of the
expenditure budget over the di®erent consumption goods alters, but also the full income
of the household is reallocated between consumption and leisure, it is important to
capture the (supposedly negative) welfare impact of increased labour supply and labour
market participation entailed by this kind of reform. The latter aspect has been pointed
at in other recent contributions in the ¯eld like Aaberge, Colombino and Str¿m (2000)
and Aaberge, Dagsvik and Str¿m (1995). To investigate this sensitivity we deliberately
disconnect the normative tool used for assessing the change in the distribution of welfare,
3from the positive tool used to predict behavioural reactions both in commodity demands
and labour supply. Our results con¯rm that even the choice of a speci¯c cardinalisation
a®ect the results. Therefore the particular choice needs to be motivated.
Using existing microsimulation models, we also share their limitations. Firstly, we
do not appropriately deal with labour market imperfections and involuntary unemploy-
ment. Nor do we take into account partial or general equilibrium e®ects on the labour
demand side. Also the impact of the reform on savings (future consumption) and durable
consumption goods is not taken up in the present welfare analysis.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the reform we
analyse and simulate. It also brie°y overviews the datasets and microsimulation models
that we will use. We explain how we have matched expenditure data in the underlying
income dataset of the tax bene¯t model, and how demand reactions and labour supply
have been modelled. In section 3 we prepare the ground for the sensitivity analysis by
describing the di®erent possibilities to measure welfare e®ects of price changes. Section 4
presents the results of the reform without taking into account the labour supply reaction.
We focus here on the sensitivity of the picture of gainers and losers to the chosen welfare
concept. In section 5 we then introduce °exible labour supply for a subsample of the
population and redo the sensitivity analysis of the distributional picture to the chosen
welfare concept. Section 6 concludes.
2 The simulated reform and the adopted microsimulation
approach
2.1 The reform and the assumption of an unchanged gross wage
Most of the reforms analysed by means of macro or cge-models concern reductions in
social security contributions paid by the employer. Here, however, we have modelled
a reduction of social security contributions paid by the employee. Indeed, we do not
dispose of a model that covers the demand side of the labour market and the dependence
of the labour cost on these contributions. We lower social security contributions paid
by the employees by a substantial amount of 25%.
Moreover, we have assumed that the reduction of the social security contributions
is fully shifted forward into an increase of the net wage. In the appendix (section 7.1)
we have spelled out the assumptions su±cient to underpin an unchanged gross wage: a
perfectly °exible labour demand. In that case, the reduction of the contribution is fully
re°ected into a corresponding increase in the net wage of the employee, and hence in
disposable income. This assumption re°ects the partial character of the analysis when
we introduce labour supply reactions in the analysis.
With ¯xed labour supply, and eventually even with an increase in employment, the
foregone revenues from the social security contributions have to be compensated. We
4have chosen to increase both the standard and the reduced vat-rate. We have crudely
estimated how much we had to increase both rates to obtain revenue neutrality in the
case where labour supply was ¯xed. It turned out that we had to increase the standard
vat- rate from 21% to 25%, and the reduced rate from 6% to 7%. Table 1 shows the
resulting price change for the commodities on which our indirect tax model is built. The
¯rst column shows the share in disposable income for 13 expenditure categories and for
saving. The second column shows the indirect tax rate for the aggregates in percent of
the producer price for the baseline Belgian indirect tax system of 2005 and the rightmost
columns give the resulting consumer prices expressed in terms of ¯xed producer prices
normalised at unity. The implemented vat change also induces substantial relative price
changes. Since tobacco products not only bear vat and excise duties, but also an ad
valorem excise which is expressed as a percentage of the consumer price (hence also
taxing vat and excise duties), the consumer price for tobacco products goes up with
9%. For commodities subjected to the standard vat rate of 21%, the price increase
amounts to around 3.3% (from 1.21 to 1.25), whereas the price of commodities taxed at
the reduced rate goes up from 1.06 to 1.07, or 0.94%.
Table 1: Commodity breakdown, shares in disposable income, and indirect tax rates for
the nis budget survey 2001
Commodity share in baseline indirect consumer consumer price
aggregate disposable tax rate price price change
income in % of baseline reform in %
producer price
Food 11.3 6.2 1.0620 1.0721 0.95
Drinks - Non Alcoholic 0.9 7.7 1.0772 1.0874 0.94
Drinks - Alcoholic 1.3 40.9 1.4090 1.4556 3.31
Tobacco 0.8 207.5 3.0746 3.3516 9.01
Clothing, footwear 4.7 20.8 1.2085 1.2482 3.28
Rent, Utilities, Heating 23.7 5.0 1.0502 1.0590 0.84
Private transport 6.3 47.4 1.4738 1.5155 2.83
Public transport 0.4 5.3 1.0525 1.0613 0.83
Hygienics, Health 5.8 7.7 1.0775 1.0919 1.34
Leisure commodities 12.8 10.7 1.1067 1.1267 1.81
Other commodities 11.2 7.2 1.0722 1.0860 1.28
Durables 10.3 20.9 1.2094 1.2493 3.30
Savings 10.5 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 0.00
Income 100.0 10.9 1.1086 1.1281 1.76
52.2 Data and models
Since the switch from social security contributions to indirect taxes a®ects both dis-
posable income and expenditure patterns (through the change in consumer prices), we
ideally would want to dispose of a database that contains gross incomes, labour supply
and a detailed breakdown of expenditures for a representative sample of households, and
one integrated microsimulation model which traces out the path from gross income to
welfare generated by consumption and leisure. We do however not dispose of either of
these. The representative household surveys with reliable income information (such as
the psbh, the Panel Study of Belgian Households) do not contain a detailed breakdown
of expenditures, and the survey of the Belgian National Statistical Institute, contain-
ing details on expenditures, is judged to be less reliable and is certainly less detailed
for income data. As far as the microsimulation models are concerned, several Belgian
tax bene¯t models (misim, mod¶ et¶ e) are available, and there is at least one indirect tax
model (aster). But we lack one integrated microsimulation model, covering both direct
taxes and bene¯ts and indirect taxes.
We therefore ¯rst created one integrated database containing both incomes and
expenditures. Next, di®erent existing microsimulation models were linked. The database
was created by imputing expenditures on a representative survey with income data (the
psbh-survey of 2001). For 13 aggregated expenditure categories and for savings (see
the ¯rst column of table 1) we estimated nonparametric Engel curves of the income
share in the 2001 budget survey of the Belgian National Statistical Institute. We then
used the nonparametric regressions to impute shares for the same classi¯cation on the
income survey. More details about the nonparametric regressions are in the appendix
(section 7.2).
To calculate the impact of lowering social security contributions on households' dis-
posable income, the microsimulation model mod¶ et¶ e was used. mod¶ et¶ e is a Belgian
standard static tax bene¯t model developed by dulb¶ ea-ete in the framework of the
eu-project euromod. It runs on the psbh-survey of 2001 and it allows to simulate in-
come assistance, child bene¯ts, taxes and social security contributions. Pensions and
unemployment bene¯ts are not simulated as the psbh does not collect all necessary
information on past employment records. For more details, see Joyeux (1999). For
our simulations with °exible labour supply the standard mod¶ et¶ e has been extended
with a labour supply model for the subsample of couples, along the lines described in
Orsini (2006) and brie°y summarised in the appendix (section 7.4).
To calculate the impact of changes in indirect taxes on the consumer prices for the
commodity aggregates, we used the microsimulation model aster. In the appendix,
section 7.3, we explain how aster calculates the indirect tax rates for the commodity
aggregates, starting from the detailed vat and excise legislation in 2005. The indirect
tax system is the one of 2005 but we expressed all nominal amounts in e of 2001, the
6year of the budget survey.1 The third column of table 1 shows the resulting tax rate for
the aggregates in % of the producer price.
2.3 Sequence of the calculations
1. In the mod¶ et¶ e tax bene¯t model, social security contributions paid by the em-
ployees are lowered by 25%.
2. As explained above we assume that the reduction of the contribution is fully re-
°ected into a corresponding increase in the net wage of the employee. In a ¯rst
round mod¶ et¶ e calculates the change in disposable income of the household under
the assumption of ¯xed labour supply. This incorporates the change in social secu-
rity contributions paid by the employee, but also a considerable e®ect on personal
income tax liabilities.
3. The resulting change in disposable incomes gives us a ¯rst estimate of the bud-
getary cost of the lowering of the social security contributions. From this a ¯rst
guess of the increase in vat rates necessary to compensate the lost government
revenue, is derived. The three rightmost columns of table 1 show the change in
consumer prices between the baseline and the reform with ¯xed labour supply (to
be discussed below). Near revenue neutrality was obtained by increasing the nor-
mal rate of 21% to 25%, and the reduced rate of 6% to 7%.2 In terms of disposable
income this raised the indirect tax liabilities from 10.86% to 12.81% (bottom line
of table 1).
4. Under the assumption of ¯xed labour supply, we only have to estimate the e®ect
of the change in disposable income and in relative prices on consumption patterns
to have all necessary ingredients for a welfare analysis. This e®ect is disentangled
in two separate steps.
(a) We ¯rst use the Engel curves, estimated for the imputation of budget shares
in the income survey, to calculate the impact of the change in real disposable
income on the income shares. This Engel curve already takes up part of the
price changes since the explanatory variable is real disposable income. We











1The excises are nominal amounts of 2005. They have been de°ated to 2001 e's by de°ating them
with a factor 0.9249, the ratio of the cpi in 2001 to the one of 2005.
2We ¯rst increased all vat rates proportionately to reach revenue neutrality. The factor needed to
get at a revenue neutral reform was 1.18. Translated into an increase of the existing vat rates, this gave
us the new rates mentioned in the text.
7where !h
i refers to household h's budget share for commodity i and qi to the
consumer price for commodity i: Note that to estimate this real income e®ect,
we use the income shares of the baseline in (1) to de°ate disposable income
before and after the reform. In table 11 in the appendix (section 7.2) we
summarize this real income e®ect by means of the median of the household
speci¯c income elasticities.




















where yh refers to total expenditures for household h.3 The price index ah(q)
was approximated by the Stone price index. The price coe±cients (°ij's)
have been estimated on the National Accounts data, and hence do not take
into account the preference heterogeneity, which does appear in the income
coe±cients ¯h
i and ¸h
i . To implement the e®ect of the changes in relative
prices, we only used the matrix of price coe±cients [°ij], since the e®ect of
the change in real income has already been taken up by the nonparametric
Engel curve. The demand system in (2) was not estimated for durables nor
savings. We therefore put the corresponding °ij's equal to 0 for the last two
commodities. The relative price e®ects are summarized in the same way as
the income e®ects: by means of the median of the household speci¯c price
elasticities in Table 11 in the Appendix (section 7.2).
5. These new income shares were then used to calculate new consumption quantities
by multiplying them with the new disposable income and dividing by the new
consumer prices.
6. On this new consumption pattern we then calculate indirect tax liabilities. This
allows for a re¯nement of the estimate of the net budgetary cost of the reform,
and eventually an adaptation of the necessary increase in indirect tax rates.
7. Once we obtained (near) revenue neutrality, we used the post-reform income shares
to calculate the new household speci¯c Stone price indices that will be used in one
of the the welfare measures that we discuss in the next section.
8. For the simulations with °exible labour supply, an additional iterative procedure is
necessary. Since the labour supply model is estimated as a choice between aggre-
gate consumption (or real disposable income) and leisure, the changed consumer
3We omitted the second price index of a quaid-system appearing in the denominator of the ¸i-
coe±cient.
8price index was fed back into the labour supply model. This led to a fresh esti-
mate of the change in disposable income. We then reiterated the calculations from
step 3 onwards.
3 Four concepts of welfare measurement
3.1 Disposable income
A common and popular approach to calculate the e®ects of tax reforms is to calculate
the monetary bene¯ts or losses in disposable income of di®erent categories within the
population. Disposable income is composed of gross labour income, which equals gross
hourly wages, say w, times labour supply, denoted by L, plus non-earned income, say M,
minus net taxes T = µ(wL;M;³). Net taxes contain all income taxes minus any net
of tax transfers of the government (such as net pensions or net unemployment bene-
¯ts). These depend on gross labour income wL, non-earned income M and a number of
other characteristics such as household composition, house ownership, composition and
sources of non-earned income etc. The latter information is recollected in a variable ³
denoting the tax-bene¯t-type of the household. It contains all the necessary information
to calculate the income taxes recollected from and the bene¯ts accruing to that house-
hold. Amongst other things, ³ contains the status on the labour market of di®erent
members of the household, because this may in°uence the amount of tax reductions or
exemptions, as well as the tax liabilities.4
Hence, disposable income, say y, equals:
y = wL + M ¡ µ(wL;M;³): (3)
Consider now a reform of the tax-bene¯t system. We denote the tax-bene¯t system
pre-reform by µ0 and the post-reform situation by µ1. If we assume that labour supply L
does not change due to the reform, the gain in disposable income, say dy, equals:
dy ´ y1 ¡ y0 = µ0 (wL;M;³) ¡ µ1 (wL;M;³): (4)
where the superscripts 0 and 1 refer to baseline and reform respectively. Equation (4)
shows that the impact e®ect on disposable income equals minus the change in tax liabil-
ities. This allows to express the impact monetary cost of the reform to the government
as the summation of the changes in disposable incomes across all households.
The reform of the tax-bene¯t system might a®ect di®erent households and household
members di®erently. Let us therefore introduce h as an indicator for households, and
4In some European countries household income is taxed jointly, while in other countries the marginal
tax rate is applied on spouses' incomes separately. In the latter case there are rules to divide common
income, e.g. imputed rents from house ownership or interests on common savings accounts, to household
members. In some cases there may be tax rules to split income from a single earner in the household
across members without earned income.
9let the members of a household be indicated by jh. Then gross labour income within
a household, Ih, is written as Ih =
P
jh wjhLjh, where wjh and Ljh are respectively
the gross wage and the labour supply of household member jh. Indicating the total
net amount of taxes - this is taxes minus bene¯ts - for household h in situation s
by Ts













Purchasing power, and hence welfare, of nominal disposable income depends on the price
level of consumer goods. Consumed quantities of goods by household h are denoted
by xh = (xh1;:::;xhi;:::xhn) and the corresponding consumer prices, identical for all
households, by q = (q1;:::;qi;:::;qn). We assume that producer prices and gross wages
are ¯xed.5 Therefore, it is possible to normalize the producer prices of all consumer goods
to one, and measure the associated quantities in monetary terms (in the application this
will be in year 2001 euro's). The consumer prices are then equal to qi = 1 + ti where ti
is the indirect tax rate on good i. The budget equation for household h reads as:
yh = Ih + Mh ¡ µ(Ih;Mh;³h) = q0xh: (6)
The basic aggregation identity:
QhXh ´ q0xh; (7)
de¯nes an implicit quantity level index Xh, associated with a chosen price level index Qh.
So, the nominal disposable income yh, can be converted into a real income concept,
Xh, measuring the quantity of consumer goods a household can buy with its budget,





Both the price index Qh and the quantity index Xh are household speci¯c through the
quantities xh in (7). A joint reform of the tax-bene¯t system (changing disposable
income yh) and indirect taxes (changing consumer prices) will a®ect these quantities by
means of the classical demand function:
xh = f (q;yh): (9)
We used the Stone price index index as a speci¯cation for the household speci¯c price
index Qh. This index was already de¯ned in equation (1), but is repeated here (in its
5This could be rationalised by a simpli¯ed Leontief model of the supply side of the economy which is
linear in the - among each other - perfectly substitutable di®erent types of labour supply, whose gross
wages wjh, increased by the amount of employer taxes on labour demand, re°ect the constant marginal











denotes the budget share of commodity i for household h.
Indexing again the pre-reform situation by a superscript 0, and the post-reform
situation by a superscript 1, the change in real income for household h, dXh, obtained












Obviously the ranking of winners and losers of a reform, induced by the gain concept
in (11), might di®er from the ranking induced by the change in welfare measured by
(4), and this for several reasons. Note ¯rst that even for a reform that only changes
disposable income and keeps consumer prices constant, i.e. q0 = q1, the measure in
(11) will di®er from the one in (4) for two reasons. First of all, since households have a
di®erent allocation of the budget, they are a®ected di®erently by given price levels: the
Stone price index di®ers across households because household budget shares di®er across
households. This cannot alter the sign of the evaluation by means of (11) as compared
to the change in disposable income in (4), but it can alter the ranking of households in a
distribution of winners and losers. Secondly, since the change in households' disposable
income leads to changes in budget shares, the price index changes in the post-reform
situation, even with constant consumer prices. This e®ect can even change the sign
of the evaluation. Finally, if the reform also a®ects consumer prices, the di®erence in
assessment of the welfare e®ects of the reform by means of (4) vis-µ a-vis (11) is obvious.
3.3 Consumption based welfare
The purpose of de°ating nominal income yh by means of a price index, is to approximate
purchasing power, and hence quantities consumed. Yet, de°ating by an ad hoc index,
such as the Stone price index, is not ¯rmly grounded in theory. More theoretically sound
is to start from an expenditure function, derived from the previously speci¯ed demand
functions, f (q;yh), and de¯ned as:
yh = e(q;U); (12)
where U is the welfare level obtained from consumption xh by means of the function
u(f (q;yh)). This expenditure function can be used as a money metric welfare function
for a household with disposable income y0













11where qr is a set of reference prices to convert welfare in the situation (q0;y0
h) into
monetary units. We will use as reference prices the baseline prices q0. We can now
construct a consumption based welfare gain, denoted by CWG, of the impact of a

































The ¯rst term in the right hand side of equation (14) embodies the counterfactual situa-
tion of reaching the post-reform utility level at the pre-reform prices. It can be expressed






















the application in this paper, we simulated these compensated demands by calculating
a real income e®ect on observed pre-reform demands, based on the nonparametric Engel
curves.
Using (15), the consumption based welfare gain CWGh in (14) can be rewritten as
CWGh(q0;q1;y0
h;y1





































































= dyh ¡ [d1qh + d2qh]; (16)
where d1qh denotes the ¯rst term in the square brackets of (16), and d2qh the second
one.
Equation (16) shows how we have to correct the change in nominal disposable in-
comes (dyh) to take into account the e®ect of the price change of consumption commodi-
ties. The ¯rst term, denoted by d1qh, is an aggregate measure of price change. The
weights in this measure are equal to the compensated demands evaluated at pre-reform
prices but at an income that can assure the post-reform utility level U1
h. Note that,
contrary to the change in real income in (11), the consumption based welfare gain in
(16) coincides with the change in disposable income when the reform does not alter the
prices of consumption goods, i.e. when q0 = q1. The second term, d2qh, vanishes when
only relative prices change. It can therefore be interpreted as the contribution to the
welfare change due to a relative price change.
Summarizing, we have three di®erent welfare measures with ¯xed labour supply:
1. the change in disposable income in (4);
122. the change in real income in (11), and
3. the theoretically more sound consumption based welfare gain in (16).
In the next subsection we explain how to extend (16) for the case of °exible labour
supply.
3.4 Welfare gain with variable labour supply
The main objective of many reforms is to stimulate labour supply, and we treated this
as ¯xed in the previous measures. As a ¯rst approach, the measures presented above
could of course be adapted by recalculating the new disposable income y1
h on the basis of
an estimate of the post-reform labour supply using a behavioural labour supply model.
However, such a measure does not capture the welfare e®ect of the possibly lower amount
of leisure following a reform that wants to stimulate labour e®ort and labour market
participation.
In order to evaluate this e®ect by means of an expenditure function as in (12), we have
to introduce an expenditure function with variable labour supply. Following common
practice (see e.g. Creedy and Kalb, 2005a), we ¯rst linearize the budget equation as
follows:
wnL + ¹ = q0x; (17)
where, for notational simplicity, we omitted the subscript h for the household, wn denotes
the net wage rate and ¹ a virtual lump sum income. This virtual lump sum income is
determined such that, given household preferences, the actually chosen optimal bundle
of consumption goods, x; coincides with the one that would be chosen under a linear
budget constraint of the type wnL+¹. In equation (17), labour supply L, is the sum of
labour supply of all individual household members and consumption quantities xi refer
to household consumption as well.
The net wage rate for the household, wn, is obtained from the individual gross wages
by two manipulations. First, for households with individuals active in the labour market
and for the unemployed where a gross wage was available, we determined the e®ective
marginal tax rate, say µ0, by simulating in mod¶ et¶ e an increase in labour supply of one
hour and looking at the change in disposable income. This allows us to calculate for





Secondly, we have chosen the largest net wage among household members, as the net
wage wn appearing in the linearized budget constraint (17). For the individuals that
are unavailable for the labour market (in practice the retired) we imputed, quite ad hoc,
the quantile value of the 25th percentile in the distribution of net wages obtained in the
previous step.
13The expenditure function with variable labour supply can now be de¯ned as follows:
¹ = e(q;wn;U); (19)
where the welfare level U is now obtained from both, consumption and leisure: U =
u(f (q;wn;¹);T ¡ g (q;wn;¹)), and the demand for consumption goods and supply
of labour derived from optimizing preferences, given the linearized budget constraint:
x = f (q;wn;¹), and L = g (q;wn;¹), with T denoting the time endowment.6
Similarly as above, we can now calculate a money metric utility for situation (q;wn;¹)
as :
mmu = e(qr;wr
n;u(f (q;wn;¹);T ¡ g (q;wn;¹))); (20)
where qr and wr
n denote the reference consumer prices and reference net wage respec-
tively.
The expression for the welfare gain, with the reference prices equal to pre-reform
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whereas the ¯rst term is an extension of (15) above for leisure and hence needs the
compensated consumption and leisure demand:
e(q0;w0






After some rewriting along the lines leading to (16), we get for the welfare gain for
household h with endogenous labour supply:
WGh = ¹1
h ¡ ¹0
h ¡ [d1qh + d2qh] + [d1wnh + d2wnh]; (22)
where, compared to (16), the change in virtual income now replaces the change in
disposable income dyh, the e®ect of the price in consumption goods has been de¯ned
above, and the e®ect of the change in the net wage rate is also disentangled into two

















6Note that the expenditure function could also be de¯ned in terms of full income ¹ + wnT, instead
of in terms of virtual income ¹. See Blundell et al. (1994) p.22-27.
143.5 How much weight do we attach to leisure?
In principle we could use our labour supply model to estimate the values of the com-
pensated labour supplies in (23) and (24). However, there is no a priori reason why
the macro-economic objectives of the proposed reform (to activate unemployed) would
coincide with the preferences of the individuals. Therefore we wanted to dispose of
an evaluation tool that allows to be more or less generous towards the policy makers'
objective. The macro-economic employment objective could possibly be justi¯ed by an
objective function that attaches less weight to leisure than the a®ected individuals.
To investigate the sensitivity of the welfare evaluation w.r.t. the weight attached to
leisure in the welfare function we have therefore chosen to separate the positive aspects
in the analysis from the normative ones. For the positive part, we use a combination of
empirical models to predict as secure as possible the behavioural reactions in terms of
consumption (income and price e®ects) and labour supply. But once we have estimated
consumption and leisure in both baseline and reform situation, these quantities can be
















with l ´ T ¡ L equal to leisure, i.e. total time endowment, T, minus labour supply L;
±i;±l are the share parameters of consumption goods and leisure, satisfying
Pn
i=1 ±i+±l =
1; °i are the committed expenditures; ½ = 1¡ 1
¾ and ¾ is the (Allen-Hicks) substitution
elasticity. The share parameter ±l is a measure for the weight attached to leisure in the
evaluation and will be crucial in the sensitivity analysis.
For this ces-les utility function, the expenditure function is obtained as:
e(q;wn;U) = q0° + (Á(q;wn))
¡(
1¡½







n is used as an abbreviated notation for a weighted
average of prices q and wn. Using the baseline prices as reference prices, the expression




1¡¾ ¢ (U1 ¡ U0); (27)


















for s = 0;1.
To be sure, the labour supply function g(:) and the demand functions fi(:) are not the
ones derived from the ces-les-framework. Functions g and f are modelled separately in
15a way which best predicts real world behavioural responses to policy changes (with the
random utility model for labour supply, and quaids for commodity demands). Next, we
plug these new consumption and labour supplies into the normative evaluation tool (28)
and (27) which does not have to ¯t the behavioural model. The additional parameter
±l allows us to investigate whether the welfare evaluation of changing labour supply is
sensitive to the weight attached to leisure in the evaluation function.
For the application we calibrated the ces-les utility function in (25). To remain as
close as possible to consumer's commmodity preferences, the share parameters for the
consumption commodities (the ±i parameters 's) have been calibrated on the elasticities
generated by the quaid system referred to earlier. The calibrated values are displayed
in table 11 in the appendix (section 7.2). Next, we perform a sensitivity analysis on the
share parameter of leisure by ¯rst ¯xing ±l and then rescaling the share parameters of the
consumption commodities proportionately such that all share parameters together sum
to unity. The committed expenditures have been put equal to 0. Parameter ½ is related
to the substitution elasticity ¾ by ¾ = 1
1¡½. The calibrated value of the substitution
elasticity equals 0.696.
4 Results with ¯xed labour supply
4.1 Revenues
Table 2 shows the revenue e®ects of lowering social security contributions paid by the
employee by 25% and increasing the standard vat rate from 21 to 25% and the reduced
rate from 6 to 7% under the assumption of ¯xed labour supply. All ¯gures are in million
euros of 2001.




gross income 122277 122277 0 0.0
disposable income 113617 115430 1813 1.6
social security contributions employee 14956 11664 -3292 -22.0
social security contributions employer 27915 27915 0 0.0
personal income taxes 38542 40015 1473 3.8
indirect taxes 11207 12865 1658 14.8
Even without labour supply e®ects, the assumption of a full shifting of the lower
social security contributions into an increase of the net wage, leads to a substantial
earning back e®ect through increased income taxes. The gross cost of 3292 million e is
partially compensated by an increase in income taxes of 1473 e. The remaining revenue
16loss is nearly covered by the mentioned increase in the indirect tax rates.7 We are left
with a cost of 155 million e.
In terms of the policy relevant parameter of shares in government revenue for the
three big categories of revenues: social security contributions, personal income tax and
indirect tax, the reform reduces the share of social security contributions from 46.2%
to 42.8%. Personal income taxes and indirect taxes go up from 41.6% and 12.1% to
respectively 43.3% and 13.9%.
4.2 Standard analysis: changes in disposable income, in real income
and in consumption
Table 3 summarizes the results for the reform under the assumption of ¯xed labour
supply. All ¯gures in e have been equivalised by means of the square root of household
size. The deciles have been constructed on the basis of equivalised disposable income in
the baseline, and contain 10% of the population of individuals.8
The results in table 3 are intuitive and broadly correspond to the ¯ndings of Bach et
al. (2006) for Germany, but are nevertheless revealing. On average, the reform increases
equivalised disposable income by 240 e (or 1.29%), but on average the associated price
increase erodes this gain nearly completely when measured by means of the Stone price
index de°ator, and even turns the reform into a small loss as measured by means of the
consumption based welfare gain measure.
However, the results are very unevenly distributed across income classes or other so-
cioeconomic groupings. For the non-actives, disposable income is constant.9 The reform
entails an increasing pattern of the gain in disposable income across income classes, both
in absolute and in relative terms, and in a relatively limited gain in disposable income
for the older age classes.10 The non actives are of course hit by the price increase. This
leads to an average loss of consumption possibilities of 118 e (or 1.03%) measured by
means of the CWG. According to the same measure, only the upper four deciles succeed
in compensating the price increase by a big enough increase in disposable income. For
all other deciles there is a net loss. The decomposition by age class reveals how the
reform triggers an intergenerational redistributive e®ect. The two oldest age classes lose
7The small di®erence between the aggregate change in disposable incomes (1813 million e) and the
sum of changes in social security contributions and personal income taxes (1819 millio e) is due to minor
changes in means tested bene¯ts.
8Also the averages of the variables in the table have been weighted by the product of the number of
individuals in the household and the household speci¯c weighting factor for the psbh-survey.
9To be consitent with the goods included in the CWG measure, the ¯gures for disposable income in
table 3 already subtract savings and expenditures on durable goods from disposable income. Therefore,
disposable income of non-actives is not anymore constant. Disposable income including savings and
durable goods is constant for almost all non-actives.
10There might be persons working, and thus paying social contributions, in households with a retired
household head.
17Table 3: Changes in disposable income, real income and consumption based welfare gain
(¯xed labour supply)
yearly equivalised disposable income real income price change
(excluding savings and durable expenditures)
baseline change change change in e CWG
in e dyh in % dXh -d1qh -d2qh in e in %
All 18605 240 1.29 11 -227 -29 -16 -0.19
by decile of equivalised disposable income in baseline
1 6814 54 0.79 -47 -107 -9 -61 -0.83
2 10295 95 0.92 -47 -147 -15 -66 -0.64
3 12520 140 1.12 -30 -173 -21 -54 -0.45
4 14393 171 1.19 -21 -194 -25 -47 -0.36
5 16198 216 1.33 3 -213 -27 -23 -0.15
6 18189 235 1.29 4 -231 -30 -25 -0.15
7 20285 296 1.46 40 -252 -32 13 0.09
8 23018 342 1.49 61 -274 -36 32 0.19
9 27277 393 1.44 74 -310 -40 43 0.23
10 37118 459 1.24 77 -373 -53 34 0.14
by age class of the household head
<18 5564 -108 -1.94 -255 -183 -4 -296 -2.47
¸18 17437 277 1.59 31 -242 -24 11 -0.02
¸30 18122 259 1.43 32 -223 -29 7 0.00
¸40 20730 292 1.41 44 -242 -31 18 0.07
¸50 21425 275 1.28 16 -257 -34 -16 -0.22
¸65 12780 50 0.39 -108 -169 -24 -143 -1.13
¸75 11565 43 0.37 -92 -144 -14 -114 -1.01
by activity status
non active 11353 54 0.48 -90 -154 -18 -118 -1.03
active 21190 306 1.44 48 -253 -33 21 0.10
18more than 1%. For the age classes between 30 and 50, there is a welfare gain.
The assessment of the reform seems to be quite robust w.r.t. the choice of welfare
measure. Of course, looking at the change in disposable income only is misleading. But
correcting nominal income changes by means of a de°ator like the Stone price index, or
instead working with the consumption based welfare gain derived from the money metric
utility framework does not make much di®erence as far as the distributional pattern is
concerned. Note that the second component of the price change (d2qh) is unimportant
compared to the ¯rst factor (d1qh) in equation (16). It is the general rise in the price
level, not the change in relative prices, which causes the welfare losses.
In table 4, we present a picture of the gainers and loosers according to the di®erent
welfare measures considered thus far. This methodology was advocated by King (1983).
It gives an answer to the frequently raised policy question: \Who gains? Who loses?".
The table consists of three parts, each corresponding to a di®erent household character-
istic: equivalised disposable income, weekly labour supply (as a step to the analysis with
°exible labour supply), and age of the household head. The di®erent columns in the ta-
ble correspond to ¯ve quintiles in the distribution of gains and losses. The column with
heading Q1 shows the characteristics of the subgroup containing the 20% largest losers.
The column with heading Q5 shows the characteristics of the 20% biggest winners of
the reform. The di®erent rows in each part of the table correspond to the choice of a
di®erent gain or loss concept. The ¯rst row, for instance, is obtained by ordering the
population on the basis of the absolute change in equivalised disposable income (includ-
ing savings and durable expenditures). Other rows order on changes in other variables,
such as nondurable expenditures (taking savings and durables out of disposable income),
on non durable expenditures de°ated by the Stone price index, or on the consumption
based welfare gain. We also add the orderings based on the percentage changes, next to
the absolute ones.
Looking at the ¯rst part of the table reveals whether the winners and losers of the
reform can be di®erentiated according to their equivalised income, and whether the an-
swer on this question is sensitive to the chosen welfare concept. The answer on the
¯rst question is a±rmative. Focussing on a distribution of gainers and losers based
on the absolute change in global equivalised disposable income (¯rst row), disposable
income (excluding savings and durable expenditures) increases with the position in the
distribution from loss to gain. That means: the losers (e.g. group Q1) are the poorer
households, the gainers are the richer ones. The pattern °attens out a bit when using
the percentage change in disposable income instead of the absolute change. But also in
this case, the reform turns out to be a regressive one. Leaving out savings and durable
expenditures from the ordering concept by switching to changes in nondurable expendi-
tures exacerbates this regressive pattern. For the ordering based on the absolute change,
the ratio of the income of the 20% biggest winners to that of the 20% biggest losers is
now three to one. The introduction of the price correction reduces the regressivity of
19Table 4: Disposable income, labour supply and age for di®erent orderings of gainers and
losers (¯xed labour supply)
Quintile group of winners and losers
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
equivalised disposable income
(excluding savings and durable expenditures)
ordering based on:
abs change equiv disp income 12287 14958 16394 20757 30126
% change equiv disp income 12292 20785 19276 21069 24225
abs change equiv non durable exp 10621 14476 16930 21221 29794
% change equiv non durable exp 11762 16161 20515 21159 23448
abs change de°ated non durable exp 15270 13300 18099 20197 26182
% change de°ated non durable exp 12317 16221 20370 21475 22663
abs change consumption based welfare 15862 13670 18449 20117 24940
% change consumption based welfare 12614 16051 20632 21601 22146
average weekly labour supply
abs change equiv disp income 8.6 21.3 27.0 31.2 31.0
% change equiv disp income 8.6 22.9 26.9 30.5 31.3
abs change equiv non durable exp 5.5 16.1 27.3 31.7 30.4
% change equiv non durable exp 7.5 16.7 26.2 31.1 30.9
abs change de°ated non durable exp 11.7 15.0 25.9 31.5 30.6
% change de°ated non durable exp 8.9 17.3 26.5 31.5 30.1
abs change consumption based welfare 12.4 15.3 26.0 31.0 30.5
% change consumption based welfare 8.9 17.6 26.6 31.3 30.1
age
abs change equiv disp income 63.4 40.9 40.4 41.6 43.6
% change equiv disp income 63.4 43.6 40.5 43.1 40.9
abs change equiv non durable exp 65.0 54.8 40.6 40.8 44.2
% change equiv non durable exp 65.2 55.1 41.2 42.6 41.0
abs change de°ated non durable exp 63.4 57.0 40.6 41.2 43.3
% change de°ated non durable exp 62.1 58.8 41.5 42.3 41.8
abs change consumption based welfare 62.7 57.3 42.9 41.5 42.8
% change consumption based welfare 61.4 59.3 41.9 42.2 42.0
20the picture, although the remaining regressivity is substantial. The robustness w.r.t.
the choice of correcting by means of the Stone price de°ator or making use of the money
metric utility of consumption based welfare is con¯rmed here.
The bottom two parts of the table repeat this picture of gainers and losers for two
other characteristics. The middle part of the table shows average weekly labour supply
for the groups of losers and winners. More or less independently of the chosen ordering
concept, the losers group(s) mainly consist(s) of non-actives, while the households with
actives are in the winners groups. This is in line with the third part of table 4, where
age of the household head in the group of the biggest losers is substantially above the
one in the other groups.
4.3 Taking leisure into account
From the analysis sketched up to now, one might conclude that the choice of a speci¯c
evaluation measure, once corrected in one way or another for the e®ect of price changes
does not matter much. In table 5 this issue is elaborated more profoundly. It compares
the picture of losers and winners according to consumption based welfare gain with the
consumption based measure derived from the ces-les-utility function. The ¯rst row in
each panel of table 5 displays the characteristics of losers and winners when the ordering
is based on the CWG-measure of equation (16). The next three rows show the ces-les-
welfare gain of equation (27) for di®erent values of the share parameter of leisure (±l).
As mentioned before, we calibrated the share parameters, the ±i's, for the di®erent
commodity aggregates such that they best ¯t the observed expenditure patterns. When
attaching no weight to leisure (±l = 0) both evaluation tools are exclusively consumption
based. The picture of di®erent categories of losers and winners is more a®ected by
switching between those two evaluation tools than by using the change in real income as
an alternative to the CWG-measure (see table 4). Nevertheless, the qualitative results
seem to be maintained. The non and less active are more concentrated among the
(biggest) losers. The older generation is most liable to pay the bill.
From the macro-economic objective of the reform (activating unemployed) this re-
sults seems to be comforting. However, this objective doesn't have to coincide with the
individual agent's objectives. To assess the welfare e®ect of the reform in case more
weight is attached to leisure, we provide a similar losers/gainers picture for a higher
share parameter of leisure (±l). It is striking that the importance attached to leisure
does play a role, even if labour supply is ¯xed.
The results in table 5 are surprising. If we increase the weight of leisure from 0 to
0.5 and then to 0.9, nondurable expenditures of the biggest losers decrease, while that
of the middle groups in terms of loss increase. In this sense, the regressive pattern of
the reform is exacerbated: poorer households seem to join the losers group. The group
of biggest losers also becomes more predominantly populated by non-active people. The
21Table 5: Disposable income, activity and age for di®erent orderings of gain and loss
(¯xed labour supply)
Quintile group of winners and losers
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
equivalised disposable income
(excluding savings and durable expenditures)
ordering based on:
change in consumption based welfare 15861 13670 18449 20117 24940
change in welfare, share leisure = 0.0 14949 14062 18647 20236 25170
change in welfare, share leisure = 0.5 12409 16453 20274 20232 23694
change in welfare, share leisure = 0.9 11624 17099 21070 20000 23257
% of households that are non active
change in consumption based welfare 80.3 66.1 12.6 1.1 1.9
change in welfare, share leisure = 0.0 86.6 57.1 6.8 1.9 1.5
change in welfare, share leisure = 0.5 95.2 49.8 3.5 0.2 5.1
change in welfare, share leisure = 0.9 95.5 52.4 1.0 1.8 6.1
average weekly labour supply
change in consumption based welfare 12.4 15.3 26.0 31.0 30.5
change in welfare, share leisure = 0.0 10.7 15.6 26.1 30.1 31.4
change in welfare, share leisure = 0.5 3.1 20.9 32.5 33.0 23.6
change in welfare, share leisure = 0.9 2.3 21.9 34.6 33.6 20.9
age
change in consumption based welfare 62.7 57.3 42.9 41.5 42.8
change in welfare, share leisure = 0.0 66.2 52.8 42.2 41.6 41.2
change in welfare, share leisure = 0.5 67.0 53.1 41.4 39.7 43.7
change in welfare, share leisure = 0.9 65.7 55.5 40.5 39.4 45.2
22age of the biggest losers increases when ±l = :5 and then decreases for ±l = :9 but remains
high. Also, the average weekly labour supply per capita of the biggest losers decreases.
Increasing the share of leisure in the welfare evaluation tool, seems to shift not only
more inactives into the group of the biggest gainers but also into the group of biggest
losers.
This result is not due to the factor which transforms the utility di®erence into a





1¡¾ in equation (27)). This factor is monotonously
increasing in prices. Therefore gains and losses of people with higher net wage wn are
in°ated relatively more than those of people with smaller wages. Due to the progressive
tax system low income earners and unemployed tend to have a relatively high net wage,
which might explain the unexpected result. 11 In the appendix (section 7.5) we provide
however a similar analysis as in table 5 for a welfare measure that is not expressed in
monetary units. The results are roughly the same, so the puzzle remains.
More seriously, it turns out that rank reversals in the classi¯cation of gainers and
losers when increasing the weight of leisure in the utility function, occur for households
with a di®erent consumption level, but with the same amount of leisure. Hence, our
results cannot be explained solely by the employment/leisure characteristics of the re-
spondents. Di®erences in consumption behaviour remain to play a dominant role, even
when attaching more weight to leisure.
So, despite some of the signals highlighted at the beginning of this subsection, the
choice of welfare measure for evaluating a policy can play a crucial role, certainly for
a more detailed analysis. We therefore argue for the need to justify the chosen welfare
measure more carefully than is usually done, or to make the analysis independent from
its particular choice. By lack of a more ¯rm motivation for one of the measures provided,
we pursue in the next section an example of the latter track.
4.4 Employment as a macro-economic objective
While the ranking of gainers and losers is a®ected by the weight of leisure in the eval-
uation function, even when labour supply is ¯xed, the fact that one is gaining or losing
is not. In this subsection we therefore focus on this dichotomous picture of gainers and
losers. We already noti¯ed that non-actives are amoung the losers. More surprising,
and less prominent in the policy debate, is the fact that a non-negligible part of the
actives is also a®ected negatively by the proposed reform (see table 6). This might raise
the question in how far the proposed reform does indeed stimulate employment.
Before turning to this question, we ¯rst want to investigate whether there are some
salient characteristics which di®erentiate losing actives from gaining actives. In ta-
ble 7 we give mean equivalised disposable income (including and excluding savings and
11For the retired households we imputed the ¯rst quartile value of the distribution of the household
net wage and therefore have a relatively low net wage by de¯nition.
23Table 6: Frequency table activity status of winners and losers
category % non-actives % actives total
losers
row percent 75.02 24.98 100.00
column percent 96.36 22.06 {
cell percent 39.26 13.07 52.33
winners
row percent 03.11 96.89 100.00
column percent 03.64 77.94 {
cell percent 01.48 46.19 52.33
total
row percent { { {
column percent 100.00 100.00 {
cell percent 40.74 59.26 100.00
durables) and labour supply per capita of losing and gaining actives. As it turns out none
of these characteristics seem to clearly discriminate those categories. All of this gives
evidence to the ¯ndings of other studies mentioned in the introduction that a general
reduction in social security bene¯ts is not ¯ne tuned enough to generate the intended
labour supply incentives. We turn in the next section towards a more quantitative
analysis of these labour incentive e®ects.
5 Introducing °exible labour supply
In appendix 7.4 we describe the discrete choice model used to predict changes in labour
supply following the reform of lowering social security contributions and increasing indi-
rect taxes. The estimation of the model and its use in simulations of Belgian tax reforms
is discussed in Orsini (2006). The model is the by now standard one in which a multi-
nomial logit is estimated for a set of discrete choice possibilities as far as labour supply
is concerned (see Van Soest, 1995 for the basic reference, and Creedy and Duncan, 2002
and Creedy and Kalb, 2005b for overviews).
Unfortunately, with our data, the model could only be estimated for a subset of
households, viz. the couples. Evidently, we only considered the couples with adults at
working age. The results discussed in this section therefore only cover this modelled
subpopulation.
Moreover two important additional problems arise due to the probabilistic nature
of the discrete choice model. In the post-reform situation the model does not produce
a speci¯c level of hours worked by the individual (or household) but probabilities at-
tached to each choice. This makes it not straightforward to simply apply the money
24Table 7: Characteristics of active losers and winners
equivalised disposable income




(exclusive savings and durables)
losers 15693
winners 16341
weekly labour supply per capita
losers 28
winners 31
metric utility measures as described in section 3.4, nor to do the aggregation exercise by
means of calculating inequality or poverty measures (or any distributional analysis ) on
the microdata in the post-reform situation.12 Recently, Dagsvik and KarlstrÄ om (2005)
derived the random expenditure function in the context of discrete choice, and for the
second issue, several possibilities arise and are discussed and compared experimentally
in Creedy, Kalb and Scutella (2004). One possibility is to use the expected labour sup-
ply in the post-reform situation. When the baseline situation is calibrated to replicate
the (discretized) labour supply choice before the reform, this comparison with expected
labour supply after the reform is of course a bit weird. Yet, as a ¯rst (and preliminary)
step and mainly for computational reasons, we do work with this expected labour supply
(and income) in the post-reform situation.
Table 8 summarizes the labour supply e®ects by decile of equivalised disposable
income (of the subpopulation only). We have summarized the transitions by categorizing
the population into households where at least one individual is active in the baseline,
and the non-active households.
Table 8 con¯rms the results found in numerous other studies that the participa-
tion e®ect is more important than the reaction at the intensive margin, and that the
participation e®ect is mainly relevant for the bottom of the income distribution. Note
however from the bottom two lines of the table, where weekly household labour supply
in baseline and reform situation is displayed, that in terms of expected labour supply,
the transition from non-participation to participation leads to a limited labour supply
increase of a bit more than one hour a week.
Table 9 then repeats the analysis of the previous section by investigating the sensi-
12In fact we are on the side of the remark in Duncan and MacCrae (1999) that \The methods by
which discrete models of labour market status are applied to discrete microsimulation are to a degree
under-developped" (p. 34-35), certainly as far as the distributional analysis is concerned. Most papers
who use behavioural microsimulation only report aggregate results for subgroups of the population.
25Table 8: Change in labour supply by decile of disposable income
non active in baseline active in baseline with labour supply
Decile Total stay non active entry unchanged increased decreased
1 112 10 62 20 19 1
2 99 2 3 53 38 3
3 104 1 0 72 30 1
4 109 0 0 89 16 4
5 107 0 0 84 20 3
6 105 1 0 85 18 1
7 117 0 0 101 12 4
8 124 0 0 108 14 2
9 119 0 0 99 16 4
10 113 0 0 94 10 9
Total 1109 14 65 805 193 32
L0 27.573 0.000 0.000 32.194 20.711 29.623
L1 27.670 0.000 1.018 32.194 20.950 29.304
tivity of the distribution of winners and losers to the weight we attach to leisure in our
normative evaluation tool. The table displays where we ¯nd the entrants of the labour
market (upper panel), and the households who increase their labour supply (bottom
panel) in the distribution of losers and gainers. The quintiles again contain 20% of the
individuals for this subpopulation and are constructed for di®erent gain/loss concepts
in the rows. The results are intuitive. Only looking at consumption, those households
who are `activated' or increase their labour supply are overrepresented in the winners-
part of the distribution. At the intensive margin (bottom part of the table) the e®ect
of attaching more weight to leisure clearly moves households who increase their labour
supply to the losers groups (quintiles 1 and 2). For the extensive margin the result is
less clear and non monotonic. Only when the weight attached to leisure is high enough
do we get a clear e®ect. This of course probably has to do with the small change in
labour supply from 0 in the baseline to (on average) an expected value of slightly more
than one hour after the reform.
Finally, we confront the results of the welfare analysis with the macro-economic
employment objective. From table 10 one can notice that, even from the policy maker's
most favourable point of view to attach no weight to leisure, 11% of those who are
activated by the policy, and 2.6% of those who are increasing labour supply lose by
the measure. Naturally, these numbers increase when attaching more weight to leisure.
This con¯rms the conjecture raised at the end of the previous section that the incentive
e®ects of the proposed reform of a general cut in social security contributions are not
uniformly positive. Activing unemployed can forthermore bear a welfare cost for some
26Table 9: Welfare e®ects of the reform for di®erent orderings of gains and losses (°exible
labour supply)
Quintile group of winners and losers
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 All
% entrants in the labour market
ordering based on:
change consumption based welfare 5.7 2.5 1.0 1.8 17.9 6.0
change welfare, share= 0.0 8.2 1.1 2.0 0.3 17.4 6.0
change welfare, share= 0.5 7.7 1.6 0.8 0.7 20.4 6.0
change welfare, share= 0.9 27.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 6.0
% actives who increase their labour supply
change consumption based welfare 15.6 11.6 15.9 14.9 34.4 18.9
change welfare, share= 0.0 14.9 17.2 15.4 18.1 27.5 18.9
change welfare, share= 0.5 40.1 17.5 8.1 13.1 19.4 18.9
change welfare, share= 0.9 72.4 21.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 18.9
Table 10: Winners and losers and labour supply incentives
percentage losers/winners
±l category entrants labour supply increase labour supply decrease
0.00 losers 10.77 02.59 21.21
winners 89.23 97.41 78.79
0.50 losers 23.08 17.62 00.00
winners 76.92 82.38 100.0
0.90 losers 93.85 99.48 00.00
winners 06.15 00.52 100.0
agents, as well in terms of consumption (because of the rise in prices) and, naturally,
also in terms of leisure.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analysed the distributional impact of lowering social security contribu-
tions and compensating the revenue loss by an increase in indirect taxes. For the empir-
ical application, a link between two existing Belgian microsimulation models, mod¶ et¶ e
for the tax bene¯t system, and aster for the indirect tax part, was established. This
was mainly accomplished by imputing detailed expenditures in the income data survey
by means of nonparametric Engel curves. The behavioural models to predict changes in
expenditure behaviour (quaids for the aster model) and in labour supply (a discrete
27choice model) remained unconnected.
This empirical construction also deprived us from one - actually illusory - integrated
measure of welfare change. We disconnected however the positive analysis from the
normative evaluation. By using a °exible form like the ces utility function to describe
household welfare obtained from consumption and leisure, we investigated the sensi-
tivity of the distributional analysis with respect to the chosen welfare measure, more
speci¯cally for the weight attached to leisure in the utility function.
The positive analysis with ¯xed labour supply is in line with recent results in other
empirical papers like Bach et al. (2006) and con¯rms the prior expectation that there
are considerable distributional e®ects of this shift in ¯nancing base. The currently
living generation of pensioners are most liable to pay the bill. They do not pro¯t from
the reduced tax on labour income, but do pay higher consumption prices. In terms
of equivalised disposable income, the reform is regressive. This picture is not really
sensitive to the choice of measuring the welfare gain or loss by means of real income,
de¯ned as disposable income de°ated with a Stone price index, or by using a money
metric de¯ned on consumption only. It is however sensitive to the decision to neglect or
integrate leisure in the welfare concept used to assess the e®ect of the reform. Even with
labour supply ¯xed, taking up leisure in the welfare function may seriously a®ect the
picture of gainers and losers of a reform. We therefore concentrated on aspects of the
evaluation which are independent of the choice of welfare function. About one quarter
of the households with persons that are working lose by the measure. Despite the fact
that these results might be the result of non-active losing members belonging to such
households, this ¯gure raises some doubts about the incentive e®ects of such a general
reform.
The analysis with °exible labour supply, though limited to a subpopulation of couples
only, seems to con¯rm this conjecture. The positive analysis is in line with the results
found in many other papers that the labour supply e®ect is mainly found at the extensive
margin of labour market participation. For the welfare analysis, the picture of gainers
and losers evidently is a®ected by the weight attached to the lost leisure for individuals
who entry the labour market or increase their labour supply. Yet, even when attaching
no weight to leisure, about one tenth of the persons activated by the measure bears
a welfare loss from the reform. To reconcile macro-economic objectives with welfare
objectives, other or more ¯ne tuned measures seem to be in place.
287 Appendix
7.1 E®ect of changes in social security contributions on the labour
market
To rationalise the assumption that the reduction of social security contributions to be
paid by the employee are channelled completely into an increase in the net wage, we
write down the e®ect of social security contributions on net wage, gross wage, wage cost
and labour market equilibrium in a partial equilibrium framework. We denote gross
wage by w, the net wage by wn = w(1¡tn), where tn is the social security contribution
paid by the employee, and the wage cost faced by the employer by wc = w(1 + tc),
with tc the employer's social security contribution. Labour demand is determined by
wage costs: Ld(wc) = Ld(w(1 + tc)), while labour supply depends on the net wage:
Ls(wn) = Ls(w(1¡tn)). Changes in tc, tn and w lead to the following changes in labour










































where in the last but one line "d is introduced to denote the elasticity of labour demand
with respect to the wage cost wc, and in the last line we use the fact that w=wc =
1=(1 + tc) in the ¯rst term and (1 + tc)=wc = 1=w in the second term. Analogously, we










































29where "s is the elasticity of labour supply with respect to the net wage wn.
Starting from equilibrium in the labour market (Ld = Ls), the change in the equilibrium









































































We only consider reductions of the contributions paid by the employee (¢tc = 0).
Equation (31) then shows that the assumption of a perfectly elastic labour demand
(j"dj = 1) is su±cient to get the case of an unchanged gross wage. From (33) it is
seen that in that case, the net wage simply increases with the same percentage as the
social security contributions are reduced. Finally, equation (34) shows that the change
in labour supply coincides with the equilibrium change in labour under this assumpton.
7.2 Semiparametric Engel curves and income e®ects
The general form for Engel curves can be written as:
wi = gi (y;z) + "i; (35)
with wi the budget share on good i, y disposable income, z a vector of household char-
acteristics ,and "i a random error term.13 The function gi (:;:) is an unknown function
that has to be estimated. When the vector z has high dimension a fully nonparametric
estimation of g (:;:) becomes unfeasible or would require a vast amount of data. There-
fore we resorted to a semiparametric speci¯cation where we retained only disposable
income and age of the household head in the nonparametric part. The other household
13We will stick to the usual terminology of budget share although we use shares in disposable income
here.
30characteristics remain in the vector z and enter the Engel curve speci¯cation linearly.
The latter can then be written as:
wi = ¯0
iz+Fi (y;age) + "i; (36)
where Fi (:;:) is a function of age and disposable income with no a priori assumed
functional form. Rewriting (36) as:
Fi (y;age) = wi ¡ ¯0
iz+ºi; (37)
where ºi is a random error term with conditional mean equal to zero, allows to formulate
the regression analogue of (37) as:






Once we have estimates for the ¯-coe±cients, (38) can be estimated by nonparamet-
ric regression. The ¯-coe±cients can be estimated from (36) by taking the conditional
expectation of (36) with respect to age and disposable income to get:
E (wi j y;age) = ¯0
iE (z j y;age) + Fi (y;age); (39)
and subsequently subtracting this from (36) to eliminate Fi (y;age) and permitting to
estimate, in the budget survey, the ¯-coe±cients by simple ols-regression of:
wi ¡ E (wi j y;age) = ¯0
i [z ¡ E (z j y;age)] + "i; (40)
where the conditional expectation terms are replaced by their respective nonparametric
estimates:























































and by and bage are the bandwidths for respectively income and age. The summation is
over all households h of the budget survey. The bandwidths are chosen optimally, but
they are not adaptive. Else, adding-up could not be satis¯ed. Hence, the bandwidths
31are independent of the commodities and are the same for all households. Filling in the
estimated ¯-coe±cients in (38) would permit nonparametric estimation of the function
Fi (:;:) in the budget survey as:


























For imputation of budget shares in the income survey we make use of the overlapping
variables y, age, and the household characteristics in z and expression (39).14 While
the linear part in the latter poses no problem, we also need an estimate of Fi (y;age)
in the income survey. For this we make use of expression (41) in which the points of
estimation, y and age, will now be observations from the income survey rather than
the budget survey. Let index bs indicate observations from the budget survey and is
observations from the income survey. Households in the budget survey are identi¯ed by
subscript h and households in the income survey by subscript j. For each household j
in the income survey, the imputed function Fi (:;:) for good i is given by (an imputed












































The imputed budget share of good i for household j in the income survey will then be15:
e wis
ij = b ¯0
izis







In the text we explain how we also used these nonparametric Engelcurves to calculate the
e®ect of changes in disposable income on the income shares. A summary of these Engel
curves is given in table 11 below by means of the median income elasticity, following the
changes in disposable income triggered by the reform discussed in the text.
7.3 ASTER and Belgian indirect taxes in 2005
In Belgium, as in most other countries, three types of indirect taxes can be distinguished:
(1) excises, (2) the value-added tax (vat) and (3) ad valorem taxes. The link between
the producer price and the consumer price of commodity i can be written as follows:
qi = (1 + ti) ¢ (pi + ai + vi ¢ qi); (44)
where qi denotes the consumer price of commodity i, pi the producer price, ai the excise,
vi the ad valorem tax rate and ti the vat rate.
14In this exercise we do not add back an error term to the imputed budget shares.














32Table 11: Commodity breakdown, income and price elasticities, and share parameters
of ces utility function
Commodity income price ces-les
aggregate elasticity elasticity share parameter
(median) (median) ±i %
Food 0.48 -1.25 0.0340 11.6
Drinks - Non Alcoholic 0.42 -1.70 0.0027 0.9
Drinks - Alcoholic 0.99 -0.10 0.0054 1.8
Tobacco -0.15 -1.07 0.0013 0.4
Clothing, footwear 1.03 -1.07 0.0222 7.6
Rent and Utilities 0.43 -1.32 0.0918 31.3
Private transport 1.08 -0.79 0.0221 7.5
Public transport 0.37 -8.73 0.0027 0.9
Hygienics, Health 0.74 -0.30 0.0214 7.3
Leisure commodities 0.99 -0.72 0.0552 18.8
Other commodities 0.75 -1.09 0.0346 11.8
Durables 1.08 -0.97 0.0000 0.0
Savings 1.97 0.0000 0.0
The producer price in function of the consumer price then reads as:
pi =
·
1 ¡ (1 + ti)vi
1 + ti
¸
qi ¡ ai; (45)





This is the equation we use to infer from the known consumer price qi and excise ai the
producer price which will be assumed ¯xed. Note that this producer price can become
negative, pointing to either a too low consumer price, or an inconsistency between the
excise information and the producer price (e.g. di®erent units).






Replacing ai in equation (45) by making use of (47), we obtain:
qi = (1 + ti) ¢ (pi + ®i ¢ pi + vi ¢ qi): (48)
This expression can be rewritten as:
qi =
(1 + ti) ¢ (1 + ®i)
1 ¡ vi ¢ (1 + ti)
¢ pi = zi ¢ pi; (49)
33where zi =
(1+ti)¢(1+®i)
1¡vi¢(1+ti) is the ratio of consumer to producer price for commodity i. From
this we can obtain the total tax rate for commodity i as:






ti(1 + ®i + vi) + vi
1 ¡ (1 + ti)vi
+
®i





where we now have decomposed the total tax rate ¿i into an implicit vat rate ¿t
i and
an implicit excise rate ¿a
i .
The total tax rates ¿i and the two components ¿t
i and ¿a
i have all been expressed in
relation to the producer price of the commodity. Therefore the total indirect tax liability
Ti has to be calculated on the expenditures at the producer prices pixi. To calculate
the tax liability from observable expenditures ei = qixi, we do the following:



























i refer to the vat tax liability for commodity i and excise tax liability
respectively.
Up to here we can apply the formulae for commodities at the most detailed level.
In simulations we will however use tax rates on aggregates. We proceed from the tax
calculation at the lowest level of aggregation to a higher level of aggregation as follows.
The tax liability for commodity aggregate K, denoted by TK is obtained as the sum of































It are these tax rates for the aggregates which are then used to calculate the tax liabilities


















The values ¿K are reported in table 1.
7.4 Labour supply model
Traditional approaches, based on the estimation of continuous labor supply functions,
have proven computationally cumbersome even in the simplest case, let alone in the
more complex cases in which multiple welfare program participation, the social stigma
of bene¯t take up and the ¯xed cost of labor supply are considered. The analysis has
been greatly simpli¯ed by the discrete approach proposed by Dagsvik (1994). Such
models explicitly recognize the institutional constraints on labor supply which result in
a limited set of working time alternatives (inactivity, some part-time categories, full-time
and over-time).
Most importantly, however, the computational burden of estimating labor supply
functions boils down to ML estimation of a conditional logit function.
The ML estimation allows to identify the preference parameters, conditional on the
imposed functional form of the utility function. The approach is fully structural as it
separates preferences from constraints, and it thus allows to simulate the e®ects of all
possible changes in the budget constraints.
Discrete choice models of labor supply are based on the assumption that a house-
hold can choose among a ¯nite number J + 1 of working hours (J positive hours and
non-participation); each choice j = 0;:::;J corresponds to a given level of disposable in-
come Cij (we suppose here that choice j=0 corresponds to non-participation) and each
discrete bundle of leisure and income provides a di®erent level of utility. The approach
has become standard practice as it provides a straightforward way to account for taxes
35and bene¯ts, hence nonlinear and nonconvex budget sets, and the joint labor supply
of spouses. In e®ect, choices j = 0;:::;J in a couple correspond simply to all the com-
binations of the spouses' discrete hours. We assume that females may choose between
working 0, 20, 40 or 50 hours, while men may work 0, 40 or 50 hours.16
The database contained almost no cases of males in couples working part-time.
Labour supply was not modelled for singles, given the limited size of the sample. At
the same time, we excluded couples where one or both partners are either self employed
or retired. In the ¯rst case, in fact, we do not dispose of information on working time,
while in the second case the labour supply is ¯xed at zero.
Household's utility Vij derived by household i from making choice j, corresponds to
the sum of the deterministic part of the utility Uij, which is assumed to depend on a
function of spouses' leisures lfij, lmij, disposable income Cij (equivalent to aggregate
household consumption in a static framework) and household characteristics Zi, and of
a random term ²ij:
Vij = U(lfij;lmij;Cij;Zi) + ²ij:
When the error term ²ij is assumed to be identically and independently distributed
across alternatives and households according to an extreme value type I distribution,
the probability that alternative k is chosen by household i is given by:





The likelihood for a sample of observed choices can be derived from that expression
and maximized to estimate the parameters of function U. When actual working hours
are used, the econometrician assumes that individuals choose freely their working hours
and face no demand-side constraints.
In the following, we assume a quadratic speci¯cation of the utility function as in
Blundell et al. (2000). Hence, the utility function of a couples household has the following
form:
Uij = ®cCij + ®ccC2
ij + ®hflfij + ®hhfl2
fij + ®hmlmij + ®hhml2
mij (67)
+®chfCijLfij + ®chmCijLmij + ®hmhflfij ¢ lmij:
16Hours worked were censored at 80 hours per week and discretized according to the following rule
for females:
H = 0;8h 2 [0;10]
H = 40;8h 2 [11;44]
H = 50;8h 2 [45;80]; for males and
H = 0;8h 2 [0;10]
H = 20;8h 2 [11;34]
H = 40;8h 2 [35;44]
H = 50;8h 2 [45;80]; for females.
36Table 12: Disposable income, activity and age for di®erent orderings of gain and loss
(¯xed labour supply)
Quintile group of winners and losers
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
equivalised disposable income
(excluding savings and durable expenditures)
ordering based on:
change in consumption based welfare 15861 13670 18449 20117 24940
change in non-monetary welfare, share leisure = 0.0 14949 14062 18647 20236 25170
change in non-monetary welfare, share leisure = 0.5 12350 16518 20565 20107 23525
change in non-monetary welfare, share leisure = 0.9 11665 17126 21349 19967 22945
average weekly labour supply
change in consumption based welfare 12.4 15.3 26.0 31.0 30.5
change in non-monetary welfare, share leisure = 0.0 10.7 15.6 26.1 30.1 31.4
change in non-monetary welfare, share leisure = 0.5 2.6 19.8 32.1 32.4 24.6
change in non-monetary welfare, share leisure = 0.9 1.8 20.2 34.3 32.5 22.6
age
change in consumption based welfare 62.7 57.3 42.9 41.5 42.8
change in non-monetary welfare, share leisure = 0.0 66.2 52.8 42.2 41.6 41.2
change in non-monetary welfare, share leisure = 0.5 68.4 50.2 42.1 39.9 42.9
change in non-monetary welfare, share leisure = 0.9 67.6 52.5 41.3 39.4 44.1
We assume that preferences vary across households through taste-shifters (age, num-
ber of small children) on income and leisure coe±cients, and we follow Van Soest (1995)
and introduce a dummy variable for part time work, ¯pt. Dummy variables also capture
di®erent aspects not explicitly treated in the model: search costs, rationing e®ect and
dynamic maximization.
For more details on the model and on estimation results, see Orsini (2006).
7.5 The choice of welfare measure
In this appendix we replicate (part of) table 5 for a welfare measure which is ordinally
equivalent to WGces-les, but is not expressed in monetary terms. The results are in
table 12. The measure is de¯ned as the factor
¡
U1 ¡ U0¢






1¡¾ with which this measure is pre-multiplied in (27), converts it
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